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Abstract
This paper addresses the design of architectures for proximity-aware services with unobtrusive and context-
based identiﬁcation and authentication features. A service is “proximity-aware” when it automatically
detects the presence of entities in its proximity. A process of authentication is “context-based” when it uses
contextual information to discern among diﬀerent identities and to evaluate whether they are authentic or
not. We refer to an existing architecture, available in our institute, where a network of sensors is used to
detect the presence users and user devices in various locations in the building. Proximity-aware services
are oﬀered at intelligent coﬀee corners where users are unobtrusively identiﬁed and authenticated while
approaching. A level of authentication for an approaching identity is calculated as the overall expectation
of belief (i.e., trust) that the identity (and not another) is eﬀectively standing at the coﬀee space. We use
the Subjective Logic as a theoretic framework for belief calculations. According to a previous study of ours,
we manage each sensors as it was a recommender giving subjective “opinions” over statements concerning
the position of users. Informally, an identity has higher level of authentication in a certain place the more
sensors-recommenders believe that that identity stands in that place. We present and comment the results
from an array of experiments where we show how trust can be used to authenticate an identity in a room.
We perform the experiments under diﬀerent circumstances, namely we change the area of the room and the
relative disposition of the sensors. We comment the results and we indicate some guidelines for a design
that aims to maximise its beneﬁts from our authentication framework.
Keywords: design of proximity-aware applications, context-based authentication, subjective logic, trust
and security
1 Introduction
A service is “proximity-aware” when it is available only to the users that approach
the location where the service is oﬀered. The presence of a user is detected by sensors
such as, e.g., video cameras, infrared cameras, pressure mats, and counting doors.
Actually, the services addressed by this paper are available only to certain users
and not to others, or access to resources that are user dependent. For example, a
proximity-aware service turns the local PC on with the scheduled presentation ready
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for use as soon the speaker enters the meeting room. For this reason, in addition to
the presence of users, we have to identify who is approaching (e.g., is Alice or Bob
approaching?). Some presence-detecting sensors, like video cameras, pressure mats,
and so forth, are already able infer the identity of a user with a certain precision.
Moreover, users can be identiﬁed thanks to portable objects, called ID-tokens, that
are linked with users and that are assumed to be carried by users. Example of
ID-tokens are portable devices (mobile phones, PDAs, laptops) and radio frequency
identiﬁcation (RFID) badges. Because presence-detecting sensors can be deceived
(e.g., a picture of Bob can be put in front of a video camera) and ID-tokens might
be forgotten, stolen, or used by entities which are not the owner, we also make use
of a whole set of contextual information to verify the authenticity of an identity
(e.g., is really Bob or is it someone else carrying Bob’s mobile phone who tries to
access the service?). We address the so called context-based authentication [2]. This
paper focuses only on two speciﬁc types of contextual information, namely location
and time.
Section 3 explains our approach in location-based authentication for proximity-
aware applications. The basic idea is simple. A sensor can detect the presence
of a user in ﬁxed locations and recognise its identity with a certain degree of er-
ror; therefore the sensor can express a subjective “opinion” when questioned about
statements regarding the position of the user. For example, a video camera recog-
nizes (with a certain probability of error) Bob entering in the building, disbelieves
(with the same probability of error) Bob sitting in the meeting room at the third
ﬂoor. After few minutes, if the camera has not seen Bob exiting the building, the
camera has less evidences to disbelieve that Bob is sitting in the meeting room. In
fact, Bob might be everywhere in the building. If questioned, the camera can say
that it is uncertain about the position of Bob (he might be in the meeting room, he
might not). Therefore, a context-aware service can gather the opionions of all the
sensors, can resolve possible contradictions, and can estimate the identity and the
authenticity of an approaching identity. A few technicalities need to be arranged:
how to mathematically deﬁne a sensor’s opinion, how to calculate it, and how to
merge diﬀerent opinions. As algebra of opinions we use the Subjective Logic [9].
In Subjective Logic it is possible to model an opinion over the truth of an event in
terms of belief, disbelief, and uncertainty. Other logic of belief for authentication,
like the BAN logic [3], are not appropriate, as we look for quantitative analysis of
belief (i.e., our beliefs, disbeliefs and uncertainties are real numbers). We have not
investigated the use of fuzzy logic, but according to [14], a fuzzy logic approach is
more appropriate for an “objective” analysis of belief, while in our set up we look
for “subjective” (of the sensors) analysis of belief. Subjective Logic and its use in
our approach are explained in Section 4 and Section 5 respectively.
Actually, sensors are not the autonomous agents able to have opinions as we
described so far. To manage sensors, we use a proprietary context-management
framework [5]. Hiding the technical features of sensors, the context-management
framework provides service developers with an abstract (from technological aspects)
vision of the sensor network. Section 2 describes the context-management frame-
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work and its role in context-based authentication. Section 6 describes our experi-
mental set-up. It illustrates and comments the results of the experiments that we
have conducted to measure the reliability of our identiﬁcation and authentication
algorithm. Our test-case scenario has two identities, Bob and Alice, that move
from one room to another. Section 7 comments some related work in context-aware
authentication and location positioning systems. Section 8 concludes the paper
addressing the future work.
2 The Context Management Framework
Our institute employs a hundred workers situated in two connected buildings. Each
building has four ﬂoors, and the employees that work in diﬀerent projects are spread
(quite randomly) across diﬀerent oﬃce locations. The building is equipped with a
high density of sensors allowing for device discovery and human detection by using
Bluetooth dongles, RFID readers, WLAN access point bindings, video cameras, and
pressure mats. Most employees carry detectable devices (e.g., Bluetooth-enabled
mobile phones, PDAs, and WLAN-enabled laptops). All employees also wear a
RFID-enabled badge, which is needed to open the doors and to access diﬀerent
ﬂoors in the building. The sensor network and the detectable devices used by the
employees constitute a rich infrastructure of context sources, which the researchers
of our institute utilise for validating the design and for testing the implementation
on presence-aware and context-based frameworks and applications. For example,
the Context Management Framework (CMF) [5], developed the within the Dutch
Project Freeband AWARENESS 2 , is a software architecture designed to collect and
manage raw data from a diversiﬁed collection of context sources. The CMF pro-
vides interoperability in distributed and context-aware environments: it processes
and reasons with low-level information and it can provide context consumers (e.g.,
applications, distributed services) with a uniform, higher-level and higher-quality,
context information. Developers are unloaded from the burden of managing multi-
ple types of low-level sensors data (e.g., hardware signals). One of the application
that beneﬁts of the CMF is the Colleague Radar, which is oﬀered at intelligent coﬀee
places located in each ﬂoor of our building. Figure 1 shows how a coﬀee corner looks
like, whilst Figure 2 depicts the user interface of the Colleague Radar application.
The CMF facilitates context-based authentication. In fact, the sensor network
is a versatile source of information that can be used to understand the relationship
between context (here locations of ID-tokens) and the identity of a user standing
at any location of interest (e.g., at a coﬀee corner). In a wider scenario than that
considered in this paper, also the appointments in the MS outlook agenda of users
are part of the context [16].
The context-based authentication is a quantitative process. The ID-tokens de-
tected in the coﬀee corner (e.g., Bob’s mobile phone) indicate the (potential) pres-
ence of an identity (e.g., Bob). But the identity is considered authentic only with a
certain probability (e.g., it could be that Charlie uses Bob’s phone pretending to be
2 http://www.freeband.nl
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Fig. 1. A coﬀee corner. Sensors like RFID readers, Bluetooth dongles, and WiFi access points are able to
detect the presence of ID-tokens like RFID-equipped badges, smart phones, laptops, and PDAs. Press mats
and cameras can recognise the presence of users and, up to a certain probability of error, to deduce their
identity.
Bob). The context information that emerges from the sensor network (provided by
the CMF) is used to evaluate an overall level of authentication of an identity. The
higher the level (a real number between 0 and 1), the higher the trustworthiness
that the emerging identity is authentic. Because context information is collected
continuously (at a certain collecting rate) authentication is a continuous process as
well. This means that the user, once authenticated, remains authenticated unless
the context changes. A context change occurs, for example, when the user (or one
of its ID-token) leaves the space, or when a context datum related to him becomes
invalid; for example, the location information detected by a RFID reader becomes
old soon because a user can move away after having waved his badge in front the
reader. Therefore, our system supports an automatic log-oﬀ, which is a desirable
characteristic in context-aware authentication solutions (e.g., see [2]).
The design of our context-based authentication solution is not straightforward.
First, we want to avoid the use of strongly conﬁdential information like PIN, pass-
words, or credit cards numbers; coﬀee corners are social and public spaces and it
is easy to eavesdrop personal secrets. Second, an explicit actions of authentication,
like typing a PIN, are obtrusive, while we aim to an unobtrusive and seamless identi-
ﬁcation and authentication. Third, each sensor provides only a partial information,
for example, that Bob’s mobile phone (and not Bob) is in proximity of the coﬀee
space. Sensors are also not 100% reliable due to their false positive and false neg-
ative error rates. Only a overall analysis of all sensors data can bring to a correct
estimation of the authentication level.
Our proximity-aware application, the Colleague Radar, allows a coﬀee taker to
visualise in a wall screen the location of his/her colleagues. Privacy policies control
the visualisation of the position of an employee. Colleagues who have accepted to
have their location traced, allows only speciﬁc users (e.g., Bob) to see their position.
They can also demand that Bob’s identity must be authenticated above a certain
threshold before having their locational data disclosed: Alice wants to avoid that
someone using Bob’s mobile phone and pretending to be Bob can see her position.
In a future version of the application, policies will allow Alice to hide her data
also when Bob stands not alone at the coﬀee corner (i.e., when other colleagues
accompany Bob).
The success of this kind of presence-aware applications strongly depends on
reliability of the authentication methods that protect applications from misuses.
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Fig. 2. (a) A screen-shot of Colleagues Radar interface. The position of the colleagues (here highlighted with
arrows and circles, which are not part of the interface) who have allowed Bob to trace them, is visualised
onto a three dimensional model of the building. Some colleagues can ask Bob’s identity to be certiﬁed with
an high level as a condition to have their position shown. (b) A screen-shot that shows the authentication
level for Bob (the small labels indicate the kind of context information used) and a list of polices with
respect to Bob’s authentication level. Here, for example, Alice requires Bob to be authenticated with level
at least 90 before having her position shown. Being Bob’s level 85, her location is not shown and labelled
“denied”.
The experiments conducted in the research scope of this paper give insights on
some related questions.
3 Trust-enhanced Context-based Authentication
We deﬁne the level of authentication in terms of trust, namely, “expectation of belief
that the authentic identity (and not other) is eﬀectively in a given location”. The
main idea of a trust-enhanced authentication has been introduced and described
in [13]. We use the Subjective Logic (see also Section 4) as an algebra of trust.
Subjective Logic is a calculus compatible with the binary logic, probability calculus
and classical probabilistic logic [8]. Probabilistic logics combine the capabilities of
binary logic and probability to express degrees of trust of certain arguments. The
Subjective Logic has the advantage of expressing uncertainty about the probabil-
ity values themselves. Real situations can be more realistically modelled, and the
conclusions reﬂect more the ignorance and uncertainty about the input arguments.
Our approach is related to the research in recommender networks. At a concep-
tual level sensors are seen as recommenders. When a sensor is asked for an opinion
(about a certain statement to be true) it answers giving a value that expresses the
amount of trust it has on the statement to be true from its point of view, that is,
from what it has sensed in the environment. The overall evaluation on the belief
in the truth of the statement is obtained by merging the opinions of the available
sensors.
Considering a sensor as a recommender is an abstraction. The real sensors are
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passive objects and mostly without intelligent capabilities. In fact, it is the CMF
that collects sensors data over time and calculates opinions on the sensors behalf.
The CMF knows the technical features of the sensors and it has access to their
logged data. In the following, we stick to considering our sensors as autonomous
recommenders, but the reader must be aware that this useful interpretation in
indeed justiﬁed by the existence of our CMF.
What is the advantage of considering sensors as recommenders? The vision of
sensors as recommenders provides a highly scalable approach to the design of sensor
fusion algorithms. A new kind of sensor can be easily introduced in the architecture
whenever we are able to provide a component that calculates an opinion on behalf
of the sensor. The algorithm that merges opinions does not need modiﬁcation. The
merging is linear in the number of opinions, then of sensors. Our solution out-
performs previous works based on conditional probability whose fusing algorithm is
exponential in the number of sensors [7]. Moreover, being the Subjective Logic used
in the management of reputation network [10], we see the possibility of interesting
extensions. For example, we might extend our framework with a reputation network
of sensors. Thus, sensors’ opinions can be discounted, or even discarded, depending
upon the sensors’ reputation in giving honest or accurate feedbacks. The details of
such a design are left as future work.
Which kind of recommendation/opinion can give a sensor? A sensor can deter-
mine whether an identity becomes noticeable in the zone it controls or it does not.
For example, a pressure mat can detect the presence of someone who weights as
Bob. An WiFi access point can say that Bob’s laptop is in range. A sensor can
organise its knowledge to answer a question about Bob’s position. For example,
if the pressure mat staying in Bob’s room detects the presence of Bob, the mat
disbelieves that “Bob’s is at the coﬀee corner and not in his room”. This amount of
disbelieve is aﬀected by the false positive and the false negative probability of error
of this speciﬁc mat. In summary, if u is an identity and , ′, · · · are a locations, each
sensor can provide opinions about propositional formula constructed from simple
propositions of form u ∈ , u ∈ ′, etc.
The next sections describe our theoretical framework, deﬁne what a sensor’s
opinions is, and discuss how to process the opinions originating from the sensor
network to obtain an overall authentication level.
4 Subjective Logic
This section reminds the basics of the Subjective Logic (SL). All the deﬁnitions are
taken from [9,8]. A ﬁnite set Θ is called a frame of discernment, or simply a frame,
when its elements are interpreted as possible answers to a certain question. A frame
is an epistemic object and its elements are correct relative to a subjective knowledge
of an entity, let say s. A state is an non-empty subset of elements in Θ. Given a
frame of discernment Θ, a belief mass assignment in the subjective knowledge of s,
is a function msΘ : 2
Θ → [0, 1] such that for each x ∈ 2Θ, msΘ(x) ≤ 1, msΘ(∅) = 0,
and
∑
x∈2Θ m
s
Θ(x) = 1. Here, 2
Θ is the power-set of Θ. Thus msΘ(p) expresses
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the belief assigned to the state p according to s. It does not express any belief in
sub-states of p in particular.
Deﬁnition 4.1 [SL Opinion] Given a frame of discernment Θ, a SL opinion on a
state p ∈ 2Θ is a quadruple ωp = (b(p), d(p), u(p), a(p)). The items b(p), d(p), and
u(p) are called belief, disbelief, and uncertainty respectively. They range over [0, 1],
and are such that b(p) + d(p) + u(p) = 1. Item a(p) is called the relative atomicity
and is a function from 2Θ to [0, 1] that satisﬁes a(∅) = 0 and ∑x∈2Θ a(p)(x) = 1.
An SL opinion expresses the belief, the disbelief, and the uncertainty about a
state p to be true in the subjective knowledge of s. The atomicity a(p) models
an a priori probability expectation before any evidence has been received. Given
a belief mass assignment msΘ, an SL opinion on p in the knowledge of s ω
s
p =
(b(p), d(p), u(p), a(p))), is calculated as follows (x ranges over 2Θ):
b(p) =
∑
x⊆p
msΘ(x) d(p) =
∑
x∩p=∅
msΘ(x) u(p) =
∑
x∩p=∅,x⊆p
msΘ(x)
The choice of a(p) is situational dependent. A common deﬁnition is a(p)(x) =
|p∩x|/|x|, where |x| is the cardinality of set x. Given an opinion ωsp, the probability
of expectation of p being true, E(p), is calculated as E(p) = b(p) + a(p)u(p). Note
that the relative atomicity weights the eﬀect of the uncertainty in the expectation
of belief.
The Subjective Logic theory has both basic logic operators and some non-
conventional operators for combining SL opinions. We use the following operators
of the SL: Bayesian consensus (⊕), the negation (¬), and the conjunction (∧). The
binary operator ⊕ is used to used to “merge” independent SL opinions on p. If
ωsp and ω
s′
p are two SL opinions on p in the subjective viewpoint of the entities s
and s′ respectively, then ωsp ⊕ ωs
′
p is the SL opinion ω
{s,s′}
p of the imaginary entity
{s, s′}; it reﬂects the SL opinions of s and s′ both in a fair and equal way. If ωsp and
ωsp′ are two SL opinions of the same entity s on p and p
′ respectively, then ¬ωsp is
the SL opinion ωs¬p that s has over ¬p and ωsp ∧ ωsp′ is the SL opinion ωsp∧p′ that s
has on p∧ p′. Another SL operator mentioned in this paper, is the binary operator
⊗, which is used to discount an opinion a depending upon the (referral) trust of
its source, and the average consensus [12], which is used to merge the opinions of
dependent sources. All the SL operators are described in [8].
5 Building SL Opinions from Sensor
This section explains how to calculate a sensor’s SL opinion. It extends an idea
ﬁrst introduced in [13], where we showed how to build opinions on simple statement
like “Bob is in the conference room”. In this paper, sensors can give opinions on
composite statements like “Bob is in the conference room and not in his oﬃce”.
Let L be the space of all locations. We call “cell” the portion of L controlled by
a sensor. With 1, . . . , n we indicate the (not necessarily disjoint) cells controlled
by the independent sensors s1, . . . , sn, respectively. When a sensor si detects an
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ID-token related to the identity u (written si(u) = 1), si “believes” u ∈ i with
probability P (u ∈ i | si(u) = 1). The exact location of u within a cell is unknown.
It can occupy any position inside the cell with the same probability. When si
does not detect u (written si(u) = 0), u can stay anywhere outside i (i.e., u 
∈ i or
equivalently u ∈ L\i) with probability P (u 
∈ i |si(u) = 0). Probabilities P (u 
∈ i |
si(u) = 0) and P (u ∈ i |si(u) = 1) are calculated by applying the Bayesian theorem
to the sensors’ false positive and false negative error technical speciﬁcations [13];
the sensors are assumed conditional independent. Whenever the sensor si is asked
for an SL opinion about the statement u ∈ , a frame Θi can be deﬁned over the
(mutually disjoint) propositions identiﬁed by the zones intercepted, over L, by i
(controlled by the sensor) and by  The frame is deﬁned as follows (we use p(x) as
a shortcut for u ∈ x):
Θi = {p(i ∩ ), p(i \ ), p( \ i), p(L \ (i ∪ ))}
According to the knowledge of si and dependent to whether its has or has not
detected u at the time t, si associates the belief masses m
si(u)=1
Θi
(x) or msi(u)=0Θi (x),
respectively, to the frame Θi. These masses are deﬁned as follows:
msi=1Θi (x)=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
P (u ∈ i |si(u) = 1),
if x = {p(i\), p(i ∩ )}
1− P (u ∈ i |si(u) = 1),
if x = {p(\i), p(L\(i∪))}
0, otherwise
msi=0Θi (x)=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1− P (u 
∈ i |si = 0),
if x = {p(i\), p(i ∩ )}
P (u 
∈ i |si(u) = 0),
if x = {p(\i), p(L\(i∪))}
0, otherwise
These believe masses represent the knowledge, local to si, about the truth of the
statements that compose Θi. The SL opinion ωsip() that si has in the proposition
p() is calculated according to Deﬁnition 4.1. (Here we assume, with a little abuse
of notation, that p() ⊆ p(′) iﬀ  ⊆ ′, p()∩ p(′) = ∅ iﬀ ∩ ′ = ∅). Figure 3 sum-
marises, in picture, the rational underneath the construction of ωsip(). For example,
let us consider the case i ∩  = ∅ when si detects u. In Figure 3 it corresponds
to the second square from the left. The sensor has no reason to belief that u ∈ .
On the contrary, the sensor has evidence to disbelief that u ∈  because, accord-
ing to its knowledge, u ∈ i, and i ∩  = ∅. The amount of si’s disbelief is the
probability, P = P (u ∈ i|si = 1), that u ∈ i given that si has triggered correctly.
The sensor has also an amount of uncertainty, which depends on the probability,
1 − P = P (u 
∈ i|si = 1), that si is misbehaving. This latter is a typical case in
which uncertainty comes in play; in fact, according to SL, uncertainty arises where
there are evidences neither to believe nor to disbelieve. The relative atomicity (not
shown in the picture but reported in Algorithm 1) is calculated to weight the im-
pact of this uncertainty in the expectation of belief; in the case we are describing,
it depends on the ratio between the size of  and the size of the complement of i
(i.e., on the probability that the user, not being in i is incidentally in ).
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Fig. 3. Depending on the relative position between  and i we have diﬀerent frames of discernment, belief
masses and, consequently, SL opinions. On the left, the four cases (the ﬁrst box on the left summarises two
cases) that emerge when the sensor si detects the presence of u (u is the black dot) in the cell i. A ﬁfth
case, omitted, happens when  = i. On the right, the four cases (the last box on the right summarises
two cases) that occur when the sensor si does not detect u (u is the black dot) in the cell i. A ﬁfth case,
omitted, happens when  = i.
There is an additional observation that is worth to be mentioned here. Because
not all sensors scan their area at the same time, when si is consulted at time t, it
may have not fresh observations. We allow si to look back at what it has collected
at time t′ ≤ t, where t′ is the time of the most recent observation. Here we require
that the sensor’s old observation is meaningful only if it is aged less than a certain
t0 (i.e., Δt = t− t′ < t0. Moreover, si considers that u may have moved during the
time interval Δt and that u might be in the wider area i + Δi at time t; so si
“adapts” the relative atomicity of its opinion to the wider area. The cell increment
Δi is calculated according to a model of movement of user in the space L along
the interval Δt. Note that Δt = 0 implies Δi = 0. Algorithm 1 gives the complete
procedure for calculating ωsip().
An SL opinion ωsip(1,··· ,k) over a propositional statement p(1, · · · , k) is calcu-
lated by asking for each single SL opinion ωsij for all j and later by applying the SL
operators ¬ and ∧. We remind that ωs¬p = ¬ωsp and ωsp∧p′ = ωsp ∧ ωsp′ . The level of
authenticity of an identity in a certain location  is calculated from the SL opinions
of all the available sensors in S = ∪i{si|si’s most recent data has age at most t0}.
The SL opinions are merged with the ⊕ operator to obtain an overall ω = ωSp(1,··· ,k).
Then we set the level of authentication to be the expectation of belief E(ω).
6 Experiments
We have organised our experimental set-up around four scenarios, numbered from 1
to 4. All the scenarios share a simple geometry, which consists of a certain number
of sensors (each controlling a cell) and two spaces called, respectively, room 1 and
room 2. Room 1 is the location of our proximity-aware application. Two identities,
Bob and Alice, stay initially at room 1 and room 2, respectively. Figure 4 illustrates
the four scenarios. In scenario 1, the rooms are bigger than the sensors’ cells. In
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Data: si and, at time t, a request for opinion on p() = u ∈ 
Result: An SL opinion ωsip(l)
if si(u) = 1 at time t′, and t− t′ < t0 then
P ← P (u ∈ i |si(u) = 1);
E ← P · ( |∩(i + Δi)||(i + Δi)| ) + (1− P ) · (
|∩(L\(i + Δi))|
|L\(i + Δi)| );
if  = (i +Δi) then ωsip() ← (P , 1− P , 0, 0.5);
if  ⊂ (i +Δi) then ωsip() ← (0, 1− P , P, EP );
if  ∩ (i +Δi) = ∅ then ωsip() ← (0, P , 1− P , EP );
if  ⊃ (i +Δi) then ωsip() ← (P , 0, 1− P , E−P1−P );
if  ∩ (i +Δi) 
= ∅ then ωsip() ← (0, 0, 1, E);
end
if si(u) = 0 at time t′, and t− t′ < t0 then
P ← P (u 
∈ i |si(u) = 0);
E ← (1− P ) · ( |∩i||i| ) + P · (
|∩(L\i|)
(|L\i)| );
if  = i then ωsip() ← (1− P , P , 0, 0.5);
if  ⊂ i then ωsip() ← (0, P , 1− P, E1−P );
if  ∩ i = ∅ then ωsip() ← (0, 1− P , P , EP );
if  ⊃ i then ωsip() ← (1− P , 0, P , E−(1−P )P );
if  ∩ i 
= ∅ then ωsip() ← (0, 0, 1, E);
end
Algorithm 1: SL opinion for sensor si on p()
scenario 2, we increase the number of sensors from six to ten. In scenario 3, each
room is smaller than a cell. In scenario 4, the rooms are closer and no sensor covers
entirely and exactly a room. The sensors are assumed to be able to detect one
type of device, let say a Bluetooth mobile phone. We assume that all the sensors
have the same technical features, namely, the same frequency of scanning, and the
same 1% of false positive and false negative rates. The algorithms for calculation,
collection, and fusing of opinions are written in Objective Caml 3 .
In each scenario we perform the following three experiments: (A) Bob and Alice
move without exiting from the room they are; (B) Alice goes from room 2 to room 1;
(C) Alice goes from room 2 to room 1 and back. Figure 5 illustrates, in reference to
scenario 1, the three movement patterns. In the ﬁgure, the exact position of Alice
and Bob is only sketched (for the details, see next subsection). Finally, we run
the twelve experiments (1.A, 1.B, · · · , 4.C) asking for opinions about the following
statements: “what about Bob (resp. Alice) staying in room 1?”, and “what Bob
(resp. Alice) staying in room 1 and not in room 2?”.
3 http://caml.inria.fr
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Fig. 4. A pictorial representation of the four scenarios. (1): the rooms are bigger than the cells. (2): as (1),
but with more sensors. (3): the rooms are smaller than the cells. (4): as (3), but none of the cells include
completely and solely one room.
6.1 Results and Comments
We comment the results of the forth experiments only, namely experiments 1.C,
2.C, 3.C and 4.C in Figure 4; these are the experiments conducted with the third
movement pattern, which is the most general and includes the others. We comment
only the outcomes related to the statement “Bob (resp. Alice) staying in room 1
and not in room 2” (Figure 6). The outcomes obtained with this statement are
substantially the same as those we had with the statement “Bob (resp. Alice)
staying in room 1”.
From Figure 6 it is clearly evident that, in all the experiments, Bob is (correctly)
recognised in room 1 and Alice is (correctly) recognised in room 1 when she actually
enters the room. This result implies that, if someone pretending to be Alice brings
an Alice’s ID-token (e.g., the Alice’s Bluetooth mobile phone) in the room 1, only
the sensors able to detect Bluetooth mobile phones recognise Alice as the identity
staying in room 1. The sensors detecting other type of ID-tokens (e.g., a WiFi
laptop) recognise Alice outside room 1, if actually Alice carries those tokens outside.
Such a contradiction denotes a conﬂict. Conﬂicts can be detected by checking the
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Fig. 5. A graphical representation of the three movement patterns (here illustrated in reference to the
experiment 1). (A) Bob moves but stays in room1 and Alice moves but stays in room2; (B) Alice moves
from room1 to room 2; (C) Alice moves from room1 to room2 and back.
coexistence of one SL opinion satisfying b ≥ d+ u and another satisfying d ≥ b+ u.
In case of conﬂict, to understand the real position of Alice, we need to consult a
third type of sensor.
The outcomes of experiments 1.C and 2.C are identical. Experiment 2.C diﬀers
from 1.C because it has more sensors (sensors 6 to 9 in Figure 4 case (2)). When
Bob or Alice are in room 1, these sensors do not have evidences either in favour
or against the statement regarding the position of Bob and Alice. Their opinions
do not bring meaningful information, because they have not detected any ID-token
and most of them do not even intersect the location of interest. It follows that we
can safely exclude from the list of useful recommenders. In the next paragraph we
identify another reason which makes this exclusion even advisable.
The outcomes of experiments 3.C and 4.C are more critical. Despite correct,
the maximal expectation does not go higher than 0.39. One explanation for such
a low value resides in the size of room 1, smaller than the size of any sensor cell.
The sensors that detect the Bob’s ID-token (e.g., sensors 0 and 1, in Figure 4 case
(3)) are uncertain about whether Bob is in room 1 or inside their controlled cell but
not in room 1. Despite they can not disbelieve that Bob is in room 1 they cannot
believe it either. This is consistent with what we expect from the Subjective Logic
theory, where the conclusions more correctly reﬂect the ignorance and uncertainties
about the input arguments [8].
Referring to experiment 3.C, a typical SL opinion given by sensors 0 and 1
is (b = 0.01; d = 0.08;u = 0.92; a = 0.50). If no other sensor were taken into
account, it would bring to an expectation of 0.46, the best value we can get from
this disposition from rooms and cells. However, the nature of uncertainty of sensors
0 and 1 (Figure 4 case (3)) has a diﬀerent nature from the uncertainty that emerges
from the sensors that have not detected Bob’s ID-token (i.e., sensors 2 to 9 in
Figure 4 case (3)). The ﬁrst set of sensors are uncertain about Bob being in room 1
or outside it, but they know he is within the boundary of their cell. The second set
of sensors are uncertain about Bob’s position at all, because Bob can be everywhere
but not in their cell. A typical SL opinions that emerges from this second set of
sensors is (b = 0.01; d = 0.01;u = 0.98; a = 0.05). Note the relative atomicity’s
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Fig. 6. Results from experiments 1.C, 2.C, 3.C and 4.C. In each graphic, on the x-coordinate stands the
position of Alice along time, whilst on the y-coordinate stands the expectation of belief. The dark curve is
the expectation of belief of Bob being in room 1 and not in room 2. The light curve, is Alice’s. The dashed
boxes indicate the boundaries of room 1 in each scenario.
value, which is very low. In experiment like 3.C, where all the sensors’ opinions
bring mostly uncertainty, this low relative atomicity in one of the opinion reduces
signiﬁcantly the relative atomicity in the merged opinion. Consequently, the overall
expectation of belief, obtained with E = b + au, results low too.
A similar situation occurs in experiment 4.C. Here, the expectation of belief
is even smaller. Again, the uncertainty is the main factor of evidence even for the
sensors who detect the ID-token (sensors 0, 1, and 2 in Figure 4 case (4)). But here,
even the relative atomicity in the SL opinion of the sensor 2 (considered a useful
recommender) is small; in fact, the intersected area between room 1 and the cell
controlled by sensor 2 is, in fact, minimal and the sensor “weights” its uncertainty
in dependence on that small area. Two observations follow from experiments 3.C
and 4.C.
First, when the cells are larger than the location of interest, the threshold for
a positive authentication level must be around 0.45. There is no way of getting
higher values. Moreover, the disposition of the sensor network must be carefully
design so that to avoid sensor cells that intersect only very partially a space of
interest (like sensor 2 in 4.C). In a real set-up, this means a time-consuming task in
ﬁnding the right disposition of the sensors; in fact, sensor cells have not such a sharp
geometry as we assumed in our scenarios and it is not easy to understand whether
they intersect or not with the location of interest. For example, a Bluetooth dongle
has usually a range of about 10mt with a grey zone, where ID-token may or may not
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Fig. 7. The improved outcomes obtained from experiment 4.C when the sensors that do not detect the
presence of an ID-token and that do not intersect with room 1 are averaged before being merged.
be detected depending on external factors like the density of people, the presence
of metal shelves or metal objects, and the weather. A good news, in this context,
is that with Bluetooth 2.1 dongles is it possible to tune the power of the signal
and thus the sensors cells can be adjusted by sofware instead of by positioning the
dongles.
Second, the information coming from sensors that have not detected any ID-
token and that do not intersect with the area of interest cause an (excessive) low
the expectation of belief. The SL opinions originating from these sensors should be
either excluded or treated as “dependent” and merged with another operator called
average consensus [12] before being merged (with the Bayesian consensus) with the
others. This idea is promising as Figure 7 shows with respect to experiment 4.C:
the overall authentication level is now close to 0.46, the maximum in this kind of
scenario. We leave the task of performing more experiments in this directions as
future work.
We are also considering to extend our framework with a reputation network of
sensors. In this way, the opinions originating from sensors can be discounted, or
even discarded, depending upon the reputation of the sensors in giving honest or
accurate feedbacks. An algorithm that copes with sensors reputation can be easily
obtained with the use of the discount operator of the Subjective Logic. The design
of a sensors reputation management system and its integration in our CMF, instead,
is left as future work.
7 Related Work
The research conducted in this paper is strictly related to what our group has been
researching and implementing in term of CMF and context-aware authentication.
The CMF has developed as part of the Dutch project Freeband AWARENESS. Its
design is related to the research on ontologies done in the EU-project Amigo, and it
was used in the ITEA-EU Trust4All to implement a context-aware trust evaluation
demo. It will be used in EU-project INem4U to enhance the multi-media experience
of users, which requires the use of special wearable sensors for in-situ measurement
of social feelings during moment of sharing experiences between related users. The
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latest version of the CMF is described in [5].
We started to investigate in context-aware authentication in [7], where the level
of authentication was calculated in term of conditional probability. That approach
was not scalable and the algorithm exponential in the number of sensors. The use
of the Subjective Logic in our CMF was ﬁrst studied in [13]. The present paper is
the natural extension of that work, with a more stable algorithm and a simulation
set-up which has allowed us to conduct an intensive series of diﬀerent experiments.
The work presented in this paper is also related with the research in context-
aware authentication. In [2], Bardram et al. have presented a complete overview of
methods and principles for context-aware authentication in a pervasive computing
environment (an Hospital), included a description of typical ID-tokens. They also
introduce the concept of proximity-based login to indicate the automatic authenti-
cation of a user on a device by simply approaching it. The authors identify four key
principles to be fulﬁlled in context-aware authentication: (a) a physical token must
be used to active gesturing and to initiate a cryptographic basic authentication,
(b) a context-awareness system is required to verify the location of the user, (c) a
fall-back mechanism must allow to switch between authentication methods when
one of them is not available and, (c) the automatic log-out must support users.
Our solution complies with three of these principals, with the exception of the ﬁrst
one, because of our goal of achieving an unobtrusive authentication. Contextual
information and diﬀerent authentication mechanisms are managed at level of the
CMF. Automatic log out happens naturally when the user leaves the space where
the service is oﬀered.
Our approach is also connected with studies on the prediction of the user position
indoor. A survey, with a description of several types of algorithm used for location
prediction can be found in [4]. We claim that the use of users behaviour as a
ﬁngerprint for identiﬁcation is an emerging strategy in positioning users indoor. In
this direction, [1] has proposed a neural network-based prediction of the position
of mobile users from their habits and repeated behaviours as it is captured by a
wireless network. Dedicated neural networks are used in the prediction after a
learning phase on user’s mobility proﬁles.
Finally, our work is related to the use of belief theories in sensor fusing. In
one of the ﬁrst work in this area, Wu et al. use Dempster-Shafer theory to fuse
video data coming from independent sensors, which monitor the user’s face, to
deduce if the user is paying attention during a meeting [17]. The Subjective Logic
approach improves the Dempster-Shafer approach as explained in [11]. Subjective
Logic has been used in intrusion detection to fuse alerts coming from multiple
detectors [15]. Alerts, which are opinions on diﬀerent anomalies, are merged to
calculate the expectation of belief that an attack has occurred. Alerts coming from
not completely trusted sensors are discounted before being processed.
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8 Conclusion and Future Work
We have described an architecture for proximity-aware services, and conducted
and commented a series of experiments on context-based authentication with it.
We have used a context management framework (CMF) to collect, arrange, and
elaborate the contextual information that is processed to identify and authenticate
users approaching a service. We assume a sensor network of RFID readers, WiFi
access points, Bluetooth dongles, pressure mats, video camera, and similar sensors.
Such a sensor network is actually available in our institute. Our CMF makes it
possible to abstract from any technical features of the sensors, and to see each
sensor as a recommender. When a proximity-aware application is in the need of
identifying and of authenticating an approaching user (e.g., Bob), it asks the sensors-
recommenders for their opinions about a location-related statement that sounds like
“is Bob in proximity of the application and not in his oﬃce?”. Each sensor composes
a Subjective Logic opinion from what it subjectively has seen in the environment,
then the opinions are merged using a Subjective Logic operator. The authentication
level, expressed in term of the overall expectation of belief, is calculated from the
overal opinion on the truth of the location-related statement.
Our experiments consist in calculating the authentication level of two identities,
Bob and Alice, when they move back and forth between two speciﬁc locations. We
set up a set of diﬀerent scenarios, created by varying the number of cells controlled
by the sensors and the disposition and the size of two location of interest.
The results of our experiments conﬁrm what we were expecting from our context-
based authentication solution: identities are correctly recognised and authenticated
in a place, when they are actually in that place. The relative disposition of the
sensors and the location where the proximity service is being oﬀered have a visible
impact on the maximal expectation of belief (a real number) we can obtain. This
phenomenon is observed in most of our experiments. In words, if all the sensors
intersect minimally with the location of the service, the opinions that those sen-
sors can give on a user being in that location are mainly composed of uncertainty.
Moreover, the use of opinions originating from the sensors that do not detect the
presence of a user is critical. If not treated properly, the uncertainty brought by
the opinions originating from those sensors can override the believes brought by the
opinions of the sensors that, instead, have detected the user in the location of the
service.
We have implemented our algorithm in the context management framework of
our institute. A ﬁrst run of tests has shown results that are consistent or identical to
what we have obtained in the simpliﬁed experimental set-up described in this paper.
We plan to integrate the implementation with our colleague radar application, and
to have a demo where users are authenticated by using the theory presented in this
paper.
We are also planning an extension of our approach where it is possible to ask
opinion such as e.g., “Bob is moving from his oﬃce to the meeting place”. This
requires an extension of approach, reasonably by using a temporal extension of
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Subjective Logic (cf. [6]) so that to cope with time-related trust relationship.
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